Using the perspective developed in my earlier work on the evolution of banking, the main factors that have brought UK banks to their present position can be identified. Banking has from the beginning balanced the conflicting forces of profitability and safety: Lending has always entailed the acceptance of greater risk and lower liquidity for the banks, while increasing profitability if all goes well. Looking all the way back to the emergence of bank money as the means of payment we can come to some conclusions about what the main factors have been which have brought us to the present situation. Under competitive pressure unleashed by Competition and Credit Control, the liquidity cushion was run down. Securitisation began in the UK as a solution to the lack of liquidity. It was the step which allowed banks to mutate into a shape that eventually became monstrous. This process was given a huge boost by the Basel I capital accord and the Big Bang. The third factor was the speed with which banks developed the later innovations and used these to expand their balance sheets far too rapidly. The early history of banking is particularly instructive on this matter of speed.
Introduction
Banking has from the beginning balanced the conflicting forces of profitability and safety. Looking all the way back to the emergence of bank money as the means of payment we can come to some conclusions about what the main factors have been which have brought us to the present situation. The story is far from straightforward and perforce must be simplified in order to make a few key points. It is derived from English banking history and would need to be modified to apply to other countries. The outlook of this paper emerges from earlier work (Chick 1986 (Chick , 1993a (Chick , 1993b (Chick , 2008 , and I will skip much detail elaborated there.
Securitisation
1 was the step which allowed banks to mutate into a shape that eventually became monstrous. Securitisation was welcomed by a banking system 1 Securitisation is the process by which banks sell a claim to a stream of future cash flows expected from an asset (e.g., a mortgage loan) or, more likely, a group of such assets, which are then packaged up as a debt instrument, such as a bond, for sale to investors. The assets are sold to a Special Purpose Vehicle, and the SPV issues the bond. Thus the assets are taken off the bank's balance sheet. The bank trades a stream of expected cash flows for a lump-sum cash payment from the SPV. The cash flows are paid to the investors, less an which had run down its liquidity to dangerous levels; it allowed the banks to turn their 'illiquid' assets liquid. This process was given a huge boost by the Basel I capital accord 2 : the banks' response was a classic case of regulation-avoidance. The second important element was the opening-up of the banking system to increased competition. The third was the speed with which banks took up the later innovations and used these to expand their balance sheets far too rapidly. The early history of banking is particularly instructive on this matter of speed.
The emergence of bank-money
The transition from goldsmiths providing safekeeping facilities to bank liabilities serving as the chief means of payment is the fundamental story in modern banking. After Charles I's raid, in 1640, on private gold-holdings kept at the Mint, goldsmiths became the safe-keepers of choice. When they saw that their deposit receipts were circulating as money-substitutes, they realised that they could issue more 'receipts' than the coin they actually held, and fractional-reserve banking was born. Their 'receipts', now largely IOUs, represented a substitution of a claim on what was considered money for the money itself, just as bank money (first bank notes, later deposits) became a claim on 'money proper' (a term Keynes employed as late as 1930 to mean coin and Bank of England notes, but which in the heyday of the goldsmiths would mean only coin).
3 This substitution allowed 'money proper' to support more transactions by delaying the moment when a payment in money proper arrives (to paraphrase the Radcliffe Report (1949, p. 133) , talking about later kinds of moneysubstitutes). In other words, the velocity of 'money proper' increases when a moneysubstitute begins to circulate.
The trade-off, of course, is an increased risk -the risk that the goldsmith or bank will not be able to fulfil its promise to pay what at the time was considered proper money on demand. Call it convertibility risk. It is against this risk that liquid assets were held, but they could never be enough if everyone exercised their claim on 'money proper'.
The substitution of claims on coin for coin itself as the main means of payment was not smooth; it took over two hundred years to accomplish. The process of quantifying convertibility risk (or alternatively the extent of liquidity required) was, on the whole, discovered by trial and error. There was plenty of error: between 1750 and 1830, 343 banks failed. The most instructive episode was the Suspension of specie payments during the Napoleonic wars. This lasted from 1797 to 1821. Without the convertibility constraint, the note issue rose by 45 per cent between 1798 and 1809, 170 per cent in the case of notes under £5. The number of banks grew from around 100 in 1780 to 230 by 1797, around 400 by the beginning of the new century, and about 800 by the mid-1820s. Even the Suspension did not save some of them: 67 banks failed between administration fee. SPV retains the asset(s), to which the investors in the securitised instrument have no recourse in the event of a failure of expected cash flows. 2 'Basel I' is an agreement brokered in 1988 by the Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements, by which large banks were to hold capital to 8 per cent of their total risk-weighted assets. The risk weights varied from zero, for, e.g., government debt, to 100 per cent for the riskiest, e.g., corporate debt. Later agreements (Basel II and III) have modified Basel I to allow for a more complex evaluation of risk, inter alia. 3 I hope I shall not be accused of 'a preoccupation with the form of money' (see Ingham's critique of Cohen 2001 on this basis, 2004, p. 181). My defence is that I am not searching for the ultimate meaning of money but rather the evolution of its forms and the implcations of this evolution for the network of mutual obligations that sustain money.
1814 and 1816. After Resumption, with substantial liquidity already in the system, a variety of measures encouraged a speculative boom. When the bubble burst, 60 banks failed between July 1825 and June 1826 alone (Davies 1994 ).
In the early 19 th century, choosing to deposit money with banks was considered a private matter, to which caveat emptor applied. Clearly, banks were not too big to fail. But gradually the banking habit took hold amongst the more affluent (those who could afford to lose if their bank went under?). As late as the early 1960s, having a bank account was an indication of above-average wealth.
Once the fairly wide circulation of bank money had been accomplished, the relation of the state to the money supply was fundamentally altered, since the state was no longer the unique issuer. (Ingham speaks of the state's 'rejection of absolutist monetary sovereignty ' (2004, p. 128) when note issue was granted to the Bank of England. As bank deposits began to act as money, there were now three issuers. The state had a choice in its relationship to the banks: continue to regard bank 'money' (it was not widely regarded as money then and was often called 'credit') as none of their business, or collaborate with the banks in maintaining the exchange of state money with bank money at par. 4 Eventually, partly through the persuasiveness of Walter Bagehot (1873), they chose the latter path. This results in a curious position for the banks: as Napoleon put it:
The Banque [de France] does not solely belong to its shareholders; it also belongs to the state which granted it the privilege of creating money. Napoleon Bonaparte (1806) While the English state granted the privilege of note issue to the Bank of England, one cannot say that it granted money-creating powers to the banks. The banks, having gradually achieved the public's trust in their liabilities, faced the state with a fait accompli, but the principle is the same: unless the state takes the position that banks are entirely private, the state is involved, whether it acknowledges its role openly or not. As long as there is bank regulation (including reserve and capital requirements) and supervision, monetary policy, deposit insurance and the lender of last resort, all functions we take for granted, the state is involved in the business of banking (Ingham, 2004, passim.; Chick and Dow, forthcoming) , and banks are never completely private enterprises, 5 no matter how vigorously the state protests otherwise.
6
It is a curious fact that this shift to an agency relation between the state and the banks in the supply of money has never been the subject of English monetary debate, not even by the Banking School. They concentrated on what should count as money, not who should provide it and, if franchised out to the banks, what kind of quality control should be exercised. By contrast, in America at the time of framing the Constitution, the role of the state in the provision of money was a matter of hot debate. The majority view was that money should remain the exclusive responsibility of the state and that banks were usurpers of the state's prerogative (Hammond, 1957) .
Managing liquidity
Much of subsequent history has to do with the banks learning to manage their liquidity (or their convertibility risk). They established branches, sharing liquid resources around the bank as a whole. They developed correspondent relationships with London banks, which in turn had easy access to the market in seasoned securities at the Bank of England. The discount market provided for placement of excess liquidity 'at call' as well as further access to the Bank. Later they were to deal with each other and with the Bank direct. The risk of a cash drain was reduced by consolidation and pooling and, because of the weight of accumulated experience, it was felt that the risk could be estimated quite finely in normal circumstances. All these developments allowed the banks to reduce the cushion of liquidity, and the bank credit multiplier increased -all of which was good for profits.
None of these measures, however, was a defence against a systemic need for liquidity. As Keynes (1930) pointed out, banks expanding their lending in step are not constrained by convertibility risk until it is too late. Then it is the turn of the central bank to provide liquidity to the system as a whole. The Bank of England eventually took on this function. The existence of this safety net further increased banks' confidence in the adequacy of their liquidity cushion.
Taking our story into the twentieth century, two later developments further increased that confidence. First, the Bank, in the 1960s, having had much experience of seasonal fluctuations in the demand for cash, developed the doctrine of supplying cash on demand. But it is impossible to distinguish a demand for cash to support increased seasonal purchases from demand for cash for portfolio balance -to match, say, rising deposit holdings, which themselves were generated by bank credit. Through this mechanism, the increased demand for cash may actually be a demand for increased bank reserves. It would be automatically supplied. The second mechanism came about after banks started practising liability management: competing for deposits by varying the interest on them. This squeezed their profits and turned them against comparatively low-yielding government securities, as far as they dared reduce their holdings. If for other reasons of policy the Bank wished to keep interest rates from rising, they would then supply cash on demand to the banks (in other words buy the securities at no capital loss to the banks). By both these mechanisms, the Bank had become a Lender of First Resort. Confident of the supply of cash, the banks were able further to reduce their liquidity cushion.
Eventually it was realised that reserves were not even a defence against an individual bank's liquidity problems, once they had become a legal or conventional requirement, for they were not available for use except between reporting dates. They were in fact a tax levied by the central bank and, since short-term government securities bulked large, a subsidy by banks to government. The requirements were progressively reduced, starting in 1971 with Competition and Credit Control (CCC). Eventually the cash ratio was abandoned altogether; banks were to keep 'operational deposits' (i.e. transactions balances) of a scale to be negotiated between the Bank and individual banks.
Competition
The mechanisms described in the last section are to some extent intertwined with the changing competitive landscape. The clearing banks in the twentieth century had formed a cartel, fixing their lending rate at two per cent above bank rate and the rate on deposits at bank rate less two per cent. Under this arrangement it was very unusual for anyone to change their bank: there was no incentive. This gave the banks remarkable security in their deposits. The banks were subject to what looks to us now as a considerable reserve requirement: 8 per cent of deposits to be held in cash and 20 per cent in short-term bills. The building societies were not subject to such requirements, and the banks protested that this was unfair -a protest they perhaps lived to regret.
No interest was paid on current accounts. This gave banks a substantial source of profit whenever interest rates were high: this was called the endowment effect. The National Board for Prices and Incomes (1967) concluded that the remedy for this and other differences in treatment of the banks and building societies was the break-up of the cartel and establishment of a level playing field, with lower cash and liquid assets ratios applied to both groups of institutions equally. These recommendations were incorporated in Competition and Credit Control (CCC), introduced by the Bank of England in 1971.
The date is no coincidence: this first neo-liberal policy to be applied to British banking coincides with President Nixon's repudiation of the core principle of the Bretton Woods agreement: the fixed exchange rate between the dollar and gold. This and CCC were the first overt signs 7 of the wave of neoliberal economics which was to sweep through financial regulation and policy, profoundly altering financial institutions and behaviour over the next 30-odd years.
We have no need to guess at the thinking behind CCC or to believe that its neoliberal outcome was an accident. In a Bank of England memo to the Governor and others, , J. S. Fforde (1970) , a senior official, putt forward the main points of what became CCC. After remarking that HM Treasury had been dragging its feet on regulatory reform, he said, ...the shape of the banking industry should not be notably subordinated to the requirements of monetary policy. Banking is a legitimate commercial activity often inconvenient for the Government of the day. There is accordingly a persistent temptation to convert the banks into mere slaves of official policy. ... [T] his is a temptation which must be resisted. (p. 3)
And he declares his position:
7 There were earlier small relaxations of rules -what Geoff Tily has called 'chipping away' at the strongly regulated system -before then, but this was a major change.
He who argues for fundamental change must, to some degree, be preaching a faith. [I believe that] competition is capable of stimulating efficiency and innovation ... (p. 6) And so it can, but in regarding the creation of credit and deposits as solely commercial activities, the Bank washed its hands of responsibility for the money supply. This attitude won the day and has been with us ever since.
The idea behind CCC was that competition would provide the necessary credit control through the wisdom of the market. Before CCC, the building society movement fulfilled a role once forbidden to banks on the grounds that mortgage lending entailed excessive risk due to the degree of maturity mis-match. Building societies were 'mutuals', owned by and run for their depositors and borrowers. To match, at least partly, the long-term mortgage loan commitments, the share-holders in building societies were expected to build up their participation before taking out a loan with the same society. Although technically the members of the societies owned shares, these had many of the attributes of bank deposits, though they were thought of as long-term savings. They were attractive because they prepared for a future mortgage and they paid interest.
Notice that the building societies held their reserves in the form of bank deposits, thus creating a pyramid of credit on the monetary base. Building society deposits were a further substitution, just as first notes and then deposits were substitutes for 'money proper'.
Building society shares were (quite intentionally) imperfect substitutes for bank deposits: they were not designed to be part of the payments mechanism, and as holders, beginning in about the late 1960s, tried to use them for this purpose, they found them awkward compared to bank deposits. Building societies were not banks and so could not grant overdraft facilities. For this reason there were no cheques (to make a payment, the holder had to obtain a draft from the society made out to the third party), and withdrawals from cash points were not permitted. These inconveniences were offset by interest. The restrictions on building society shares were gradually relaxed, and with each relaxation, the banks faced stiffer competition while the ethos of stable saving with the building societies was eroded.
Banks responded by offering interest rates to compete for deposits, depending on the extent to which they wished to expand their activities: that is, they engaged in liability management. The interest payments squeezed profits, and that fact and the push for market share presented incentives to take further risks, including moving into mortgages and other longer-term lending, and continuing to run down liquid assets whenever they could. (In 1981, the non-operational balances required to be held at the Bank were lowered again.)
There was really only one source of liquidity left: the banks' 'illiquid' assets, their loans. Following a technique developed in the USA in the 1970s, UK banks began to securitise their assets. At the Berlin conference in 1990 I characterised this as the 'sixth stage of banking' (Chick 1993: 84): In one sense [securitisation] represents a complete change in the traditional style of banking; but it can be seen as a logical development of the paring down of liquidity that has occurred steadily through [earlier stages of development]. Devising assets that can be sold if required but which are more profitable, perhaps, than the government securities that used to play such a major role in banks' contingency plans, leaves the banks less vulnerable than they were when ultimately completely reliant on the lender of last resort.
Pretty bland stuff, isn't it? Although there is a little phrase about a 'complete change in the traditional style of banking', there is no sense of alarm. I saw securitisation solely in terms of a release of liquidity. And although Basel I had been put in place the previous year, I said nothing about it. I also said nothing about the Big Bang of 1986, believing it to be mainly about the stock market.
With the wonderful trick of hindsight it all looks very different.
The great mutation
These events ushered in not only a 'complete change in the traditional style of banking' but also a far-reaching change in the industry's ethics. In Britain, the role of Basel I in encouraging these changes has received, to my knowledge, no comment in any of the vast literature on the role of securitisation in the present crisis.
8 Basel I was designed to discourage an asset side which was too heavily weighted with risky assets. The banks responded, not by increasing their holdings of liquid assets, which one supposes was the intention of the new regulations, but by taking these assets off the balance sheet and creating shadow banking entities to hold some of them. It was a classic case of avoiding regulation; it probably would have happened even without the gradual erosion of liquidity.
The Big Bang (1986) abolished the distinction between stock broking (buying and selling for clients) and jobbing (market-making through one's own book). Oldestablished firms, many of them partnerships, sold out to banks, which were now able to trade on their own account (proprietary trading). Investment banking was soon undertaken by most of the major British retail banks, and foreign banks, seeing this opening and the general trend to 'light-touch' regulation in London, came in considerable numbers. Rapid innovation in financial techniques, supported by powerful computing technology, led to ever-higher leverage to take advantage of this new source of profit.
Everything else that has dominated the discussion of the crisis follows from these two events. Once the banks learned to sell their assets on, the ever-narrowing interest rate spreads could be regarded as a minor problem while they made their income from fees. Most important among these fees from the point of view of the present story is the origination fee. There was now an incentive to originate as much lending as possible. In parallel, with loans mainly removed from the banks' books, there was no incentive to choose borrowers with care or to monitor the performance of the loan. These elements of 'old-fashioned' banking were now someone else's problem, hence the sub-prime loans, teaser rates, ninja loans, etc., which created the catalyst for the crisis in the US. Dodgy mortgage loans were made in the UK, too,.
The new 'originate and distribute' model proved very profitable, not least because the credit rating agencies underestimated the risk of the new assets by a proportion which will remain unknown for a long time yet, perhaps forever. By now it is evident that the system had not only vastly increased systemic risk while persuading itself (and the regulators) that the risk was being 'distributed' and thereby reduced, but it was also blatantly corrupt: the ratings agencies were paid by the banks issuing the 'structured products' (collateralised debt obligations, mortgage-backed securities and the like). Technology allowed the generation of ever more sophisticated instruments and a network of insurance contracts. There is no need to go over the details.
So profitable was the new model that the banks found deposits an insufficient match for their rapidly growing assets and began to borrow from other financial institutions, increasing their leverage. This created another systemic risk and rather changed the concept of liquidity: from being reasonably clearly defined as an asset 'more certainly realisable at short notice without loss' (Keynes 1930, vol. II, p. 67) , which banks held against a cash drain, 'liquidity' began to be applied to the liability side of banks' balance sheets also. There it referred to the probability of being able to roll over shortterm borrowed funding without a sharp rise in cost.
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Many building societies, meanwhile, 'demutualised', became banks, to join in the fun. Those that didn't were regarded as dozy, outdated relics of another, more lacklustre era, as were banks that retained some shred of integrity.
As I write (28 June 2012), Barclays Bank has been fined for manipulating LIBOR (the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate) just before and in the early stages of the crisis. Other banks will surely follow. This is symptomatic of a breakdown of ethical behaviour in the industry, 10 which also stems from securitisation and the Big Bang, the latter not least from the influx of banks from abroad with a different relationship to the authorities than that which used to prevail in this country. Problems of the relationship with the Bank of England began in the 1960s, when American banks came to London to avoid Regulation Q (which placed a ceiling on the rate that could be offered for time deposits). They could not understand or accept that regulation and supervision were exercised by the Bank of England as a matter of custom and practice. They demanded to see the relevant legislation, but until the Banking Act 1979 was enacted in response to the EU's requirement, there was none.
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This trenchant refusal to submit to the ways of the host country intensified after the Big Bang; banks, now greater in number and asset size, then directed their attention to lobbying to get legislation revised in the banks' favour and flouting regulations where the rules were still inconvenient.
Before Big Bang the City was a place where occasionally there was a problem when honest firms employed dishonest people. Today that is reversed. (Hutton, 2011) Lessons 1. Speed kills. The first part of our story took more than 200 years. The transformation of the banks from institutions that at least could be sound into monsters out of control took at most forty years, dating from Competition and Credit Control, or twenty, starting with Basel I and the Big Bang. Innovations are risky. To be profitable they must create claims on an asset further up the hierarchy: deposits are claims on cash, CDOs are claims on the collateral: the principle is the same. It is vital that not all the claims be exercised at once, for they cannot be fulfilled; there are more claims than underlying assets. Therefore one must proceed to issue them gradually, until one knows from experience what the market will absorb.
2. Liquidity matters. Until the credit bubble burst, liquidity had fallen out of discussion. Note that the Basel I and II agreements were not concerned with it. (Basel III has caught up a bit.) There was a general perception that liquidity was handled by markets and that markets sort everything out; therefore liquidity was not a problem. Indeed, the efficient markets hypothesis states that all assets are priced correctly. It follows that all assets are equally (perfectly) liquid.
3. Secure funding matters. This is mildly ironic, for the original liquidity problem was the instability of deposits -the threat of cash drain. Under the cartel, deposits became very secure; then liability management made them more volatile again. But these problems pale against the volatility of funds borrowed from professional investors, which had become an important source of funding for the bloated banks before the crisis (Chick, 2008; Shin, 2009). 4. Lending entails responsibility. The originate-and-distribute model, which absolves banks of responsibility for wise lending, led to many of the abuses that characterise many banks' practices in recent years. This banking model is a mutant which has endangered the species and now threatens the sovereignty of nation states and democracy.
5. Franchisors have a duty. The State, having franchised the supply of money to the banks, has a duty to exercise the responsibility of franchisors to monitor the quality of no regulation of the sector.' The second sentence does not follow from the first, and it is very far from true: the sector was firmly regulated and supervised at that time. Was this author naïve, ignorant or engaging in Orwellian double-speak? the franchised product, empowering the Bank of England or other regulatory bodies to do the job. But the state has abdicated, expressing the view that banks are 'private enterprises' in whose activities they should not meddle. But as long as they produce our money and as long as monetary policy protects them, they are never entirely private enterprises. The State's internally inconsistent thinking is directly responsible for the current situation in which profits are privatised and losses socialised. It must stop.
Conclusion
On 5 November 2008 The Queen opened the New Academic Building at LSE. Faced with a display of dramatic graphs concerning the present crisis, she asked: 'If these events were so big, why did no-one see them coming?' The luckless Professor Luis Garicano had to respond. He was reported to have said, 'At every stage, someone was relying on somebody else and everyone thought they were doing the right thing' -the modern version of Keynes's observation:
Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally. (Keynes, 1936: 206) Having in mind the episodes of mis-selling, mis-rating and now market manipulation that the regulators have uncovered (what remains buried?), we know that many, perhaps most, market participants have also taken the view that it is better to succeed dishonestly than to fail with integrity.
Three major policy changes have led us here: Competition and Credit Control, the Big Bang and Basel I, the first two promoting competition and the last a piece of wellmeaning but misconceived regulation. The authorities must learn that competition in financial markets can have only a very limited role. It is competition itself that has brought us to the present dead end and produced mutant financial institutions that are of no use to anyone but themselves. The problem is to know how far back one has to go to find healthy specimens. Then the mutants must be culled ruthlessly, if a healthy financial system is to be re-established. We want and need a banking system which can succeed with integrity.
